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Abstract
In the 20th century, the breakup of the British Empire and a subsequent immigration-driven shift towards 
multiculturalism has thrown the identity of New Zealand Pakeha (non-indigenous New Zealanders) into 
uncertainty. In this article I examine three ways Pakeha have sought to formulate more stable models of national 
identity: the reactionary, the revisionist, and the progressive. The reactionary, associated with white nationalism, 
has sought to re-forge psychological connections with the now-defunct Empire. The revisionist, existing at the 
fringes of white nationalism, has attempted to create a stronger link between Pakeha and New Zealand through 
radical reinterpretations of history that claim Europeans colonized the archipelago before Maori. Finally, the 
progressive has sought to integrate respectfully with indigenous Maori culture while at the same time attempting 
to embrace multicultural and transnational modes of being. All these diverse approaches circle the question of just 
what it means to be indigenous, and raise the issue of just who̶Pakeha or Maori̶should determine such 
postcolonial identity.
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Approaches to Pakeha Identity in Aotearoa/New Zealand
A New Zealand passport is a thing of beauty: intricate symbolic patterns scroll across every page, refer-
encing both colonial European and indigenous Maori history and culture. Maori koru motifs (a spiral design 
resembling an uncoiling fern frond) merge into cartological grids and compass roses, amongst which sail 
waka (Polynesian ocean-going canoes) and the tall ships of the Dutch and British empires. The matt-black 
cover features an embossed coat-of-arms that includes both European and Maori human ﬁ gures; alongside 
this is the silver-fern silhouette that has become a trademarked emblem of New Zealand sport, trade, and 
tourism.
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　Yet for many non-Maori New Zealanders, this vivid iconography masks a profoundly uneasy sense of 
national identity. Settlers from Polynesia came to the islands of Aotearoa approximately 700 years ago: the 
Dutch explorer Abel Tasman ﬁ rst visited in 1642, and over the course of the 19th century waves of European 
colonists transformed the region, under the name New Zealand, into part of the British Empire. Yet just as 
European colonization radically changed the Maori world, so has the 20th century breakdown of the Empire 
made the very concept of a South Paciﬁ c “European” nation problematic. For many Pakeha 1) New Zealanders 
a stable national identity has been replaced with a distinctively postcolonial sense of ﬂ uidity and rootlessness.
　There have been a variety of responses to this question of identity. Lacking a secure national identity in the 
present, some Pakeha of European descent have turned back towards the past, seeking stability in an ideal-
ized vision of British colonial culture. A minority have looked even further back, attempting to alter the 
narrative of European colonialism through historical revision. Other, more progressive Pakeha have 
attempted to develop concepts of identity in which immigration can be seen as feeding into a new form of 
indigenous culture, while still others̶primarily intellectuals and the literati̶have turned in more abstract 
directions towards a form of identity that rejects nationalism and instead ﬁ nds new roots in literature and 
global culture. All such approaches exist in problematic relationships with the issue of Maori sovereignty, 
with many Maori activists and scholars arguing that these questions of Pakeha identity are, even in their 
most progressive forms, ultimately part of a struggle for cultural and political power. In contemporary New 
Zealand, these approaches to identity continue to shape national discourse, sparking and perpetuating 
debates that, as New Zealand moves deeper into a multicultural 21st century, show no sign of resolution.
The question of Pakeha identity
In 1993 Jim Bolger, then Prime Minister of New Zealand, gave a speech in Tokyo to members of the Asia 
Society. The New Zealand media reported that, during the speech, Bolger referred to himself as an “Asian 
leader” and to New Zealand as an Asian country. 2) Most New Zealanders were surprised to learn this. Helen 
Clark, the then-leader of the opposition party, stated unequivocally that the statement was “hyperbole and a 
very generous interpretation of what constitutes Asia” (quoted in Laffey, 1999, p. 241). Yet New Zealand occu-
pies such an ambiguous geographical and cultural position that such a statement does not seem as implau-
sible as, for example, an Icelandic politician declaring her nation a part of Africa. Geographically, the islands 
of New Zealand are part of Polynesia, a roughly equilateral triangle with New Zealand at the south-west 
corner, Hawaii and Easter Island respectively occupying the north and east corners. Ethnically, however, the 
country is predominantly European: in the 1991 census, two years before Bolger’ s speech, the population 
was 78.77% European, while in 2013 (the date of the most recent census) that ﬁ gure was 74%. Maori currently 
account for 14.9% of the population (Stats NZ, 2013). As Japanese academic Mitake Kamiya put it in 1995, “in 
the eyes of the Asian people, New Zealand is still an enclave of Europe in the deep south Paciﬁ c” (quoted in 
Mark Laffey, 1999, p. 237). Indeed, this holds true not just in Asian eyes, but in the eyes of many Pakeha.
　For the ﬁ rst century of European settlement, New Zealand self-identity was cast ﬁ rmly in the colonial 
mold. The colonizer does not go somewhere to form a new cultural identity: rather, they go to transform the 
Other, the colonized, into their own likeness. When Europeans formally established New Zealand as a self-
governing nation in 1852, it was, for them, already part of a much older entity: the United Kingdom. Immi-
grants from England, Wales, Scotland, and Ireland, having undertaken a voyage of between three to four 
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months and with little chance of ever returning to their birthplaces, nonetheless continued to think of them-
selves as essentially British. This Pakeha attachment to an imagined colonial homeland shaped the nation’ s 
culture for the ﬁ rst three-quarters of the 20th century. During my own childhood in the 1980s, New Zealand-
born television and radio presenters still spoke in BBC English, while popular media was dominated by 
British and North American products.
　Yet in the 1990s signiﬁ cance increases in immigration from non-European countries changed this cultural 
landscape. Writing of the year 2003, the year in which those increases brought the population of the country 
for the ﬁ rst time to four million, the Pakeha historian Michael King describes a sense of “cohesion” being 
“lost when they dismantled so many of the traditional certainties which had laid a foundation for a coherent 
and national view of the world.” He also describes a desire̶even an expectation̶amongst Pakeha for those 
old certainties to be replaced by a new sense of national identity (2003, p. 505).
　This desire was vividly articulated, over half a century earlier, in Allen Curnow’ s 1942 poem “Landfall in 
Unknown Seas.” So culturally resonant was this piece that, in 1947, Charles Brasch̶one of the preeminent 
literary ﬁ gures of the time̶would name the literary journal Landfall after it, a journal that continues to 
dominate intellectual culture in New Zealand. While a product of literary high culture, the themes and rhet-
oric of the poem capture broader Pakeha concerns with the issue of cultural identity. The poem, which was 
commissioned by the Government’ s Department of Internal Affairs to mark the 300th anniversary of the 
European discovery of New Zealand by Abel Tasman, famously begins “Simply by sailing in a new direction / 
You could enlarge the world.” The “you” of these opening lines is implicitly European; there are references to 
exploring “in the Name of God,” as well as a rhetoric of canons and captains that evokes the age of European 
sail. Polynesian settlement of the Paciﬁ c is brieﬂ y mentioned in lines near the end of the poem’ s ﬁ rst section: 
“ There, where your Indies had already sprinkled / Their tribes like ocean rains, you aimed your voyage.” 
Then comes a comparison between the European and the Polynesian: “Like them [you] invoked your God, 
gave seas to history / And islands to new hazardous to-morrows.” (p. 103) The equivalence, however, is cast 
in distinctly Eurocentric terms, subsuming Maori polytheism into the more Judeo-Christian singular “your 
God,” while the very term “history” resonates more with the European tradition of historicism than it does to 
Polynesian oral tradition.
　A more substantial attempt at including the indigenous Maori viewpoint comes in section two of the poem:
Always to islanders danger
Is what comes over the sea;
Over the yellow sands and the clear
Shallows, the dull ﬁ lament
Flickers, the blood of strangers. (p. 104)
Signiﬁ cantly, Curnow here moves away from the inclusive “you.” Despite the attempt at a Maori perspective 
(the “islanders” here are Maori, the “strangers” Europeans), Curnow does not address the poem to them in 
the same way he addresses the European explorers. These lines with their “yellow sands” and “blood of 
strangers” reference one of the ﬁ rst moments of contact between Europeans and Maori, a brief yet bloody 
skirmish between Maori canoes and Dutch boats that left four Europeans and one Maori dead (Karen Stade, 
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2012). While this might seem as an inauspicious start to the Pakeha experience in New Zealand, Curnow 
does not linger over it. He portrays the violence attending ﬁ rst contact as a minor occurrence̶to use his 
imagery, a stain upon the waters̶that does little to halt or even impede the colonizing process.
　With this moment of contact complete, the third section of the poem rapidly moves to grapple with what 
seem to be more profound issues. It is here that Curnow’ s narrative turns away from the past and focuses on 
the present. Yet the present is depicted here as a location of uncertainty: the past is done, “a chapter / In a 
schoolbook,” yet the future seems something unknowable. Whereas the European explorers could simply 
sail “in a new direction,” modern New Zealand seems lost in more ambiguous waters. The poem asks:
Who navigates us towards what unknown
But not improbable provinces? Who reaches
A future down from us from the high shelf
Of spiritual daring? Not those speeches
Pinning on the Past like a decoration (p. 105)
These lines articulate a twinned sense of expectation and unease. They imply a new future, one radically 
different from the past (the events of which are mere written accounts and rhetorical decorations), yet they 
simultaneously ﬁ nd themselves lost as to what that future might, or indeed should, be. More signiﬁ cantly, 
they pose the vital question of just who is to decide on the nature of that future. The authority of the Empire 
is gone: who then is to fulﬁ ll that guiding role?
Reactionary identity
This uncertainty is the beginning of what King describes as the Pakeha search for a “new sense of national 
identity.” The term “new,” here, however, is open to more than one interpretation: for some white-skinned 
Pakeha, in fact, identity lies not in the future, but in the past. U.S. historian of ideas Mark Lilla has described 
how many political and social movements around the world are founded upon reactionism, a term that Lilla 
deﬁ nes as founded upon “an assumption about history: that the past comes pre-divided into discrete, 
coherent ages” (2016, p. 132). In a postcolonial world in which the British Empire has long since fallen, 
attempts at maintaining colonial identity pair such reactionism with an analogous assumption about national 
identity: the belief that, just as England was once a monoculture, so New Zealand, despite political, social, 
and demographic changes, should maintain a single cultural identity modeled closely on its British colonial 
past.
　Such was clearly the view of the anonymous writer of a piece titled “New Zealand’ s British Destiny,” origi-
nally published in the white nationalist newsletter Counter Attack and excerpted (as part of a 1970 feature on 
far-right groups in New Zealand) in Victoria University’ s student magazine Salient. The tract is a warning 
against the dangers of Asian inﬂ uence (“the poisonous doctrine of an Asian Destiny”) upon New Zealand. 
The piece unabashedly subscribes to the colonial notion of identity, claiming that while “the British are scat-
tered about the earth, yet there is but one British nation, one destiny.” It attempts to override any prior claim 
to sovereignty by Maori by asserting Pakeha demographic and cultural superiority, claiming that “the history 
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of the majority of New Zealand’s people is inextricably bound up with that of their British ancestors and kins-
folk,” those ancestors having established political and social structures that enable contemporary New 
Zealanders to “live in freedom under British Justice” (p. 14). The piece portrays the South Paciﬁ c enclave as 
beset by dangers: not only the inﬂ uence of Asia but also the “trans-Atlantic master, the usurers of New York.” 
According to the writer, post-War Britain had already been corrupted by such mercantile powers: signiﬁ -
cantly, New Zealand “British Destiny” thus becomes a kind of idealized vision of the British Empire in its 
prime. Its destiny, then, lies not in the future, but deep in its colonial past. At the same time, New Zealand in 
the present takes on a messianic role: it is the colony’ s duty, the writer implies, to revitalize the “ﬁ ne qualities 
of courage, steadfastness, and endurance” that “still resides [sic] in the British people” (p. 14). To do this, the 
piece advocates that New Zealand forge bonds not with its geographic neighbors, but rather with those other 
colonized nations with which it shares British heritage.
　The Salient feature also excerpts from a pamphlet titled New Zealand’ s Asian Destiny, written by J.F.L. 
Hartley in 1960. Hartley was a member of “ The League of Empire Loyalists”, a white nationalist group 
founded in English in 1954 and extended to New Zealand in 1957. While the League is commonly associated 
with fascism, historian Robert Eatwell has argued that they lacked true fascism’ s revolutionary orientation, 
instead being a fundamentally reactionary group. As he puts it, the primary motivation of the group’ s English 
founder Arthur K. Chesterton “seems to have been to reconcile the classes and to re-create the community 
that he had found so consoling while serving in World War I” (2003, p. 334). While the precise psychological 
motivations for Hartley’ s own reactionary views are unknown, his writings show a clear desire to retain and 
strengthen cultural bonds with Great Britain.
　While Hartley may have shared few political beliefs with Allen Curnow, New Zealand’ s Asian Destiny has 
something in common with “Landfall in Unknown Seas.” Both texts focus on a moment of European ﬁ rst 
contact with the islands of Aotearoa. Hartley, in grandiose if somewhat awkward prose, imagines the British 
Captain James Cook’ s 1769 arrival in the archipelago, just prior to his claiming of it for Great Britain:
He came in the spring, when the honey-scent of manuka was on the hills, and the kowhai was a golden 
glory in the valleys. In the magic of sunset perhaps he heard the distant toll of the bell-bird, liquid, rich, 
talismanic. Was Destiny his companion as he stood beneath [the] Union jack [sic] to watch the 
approaching shore? (1970, p. 15)
Signiﬁ cantly, this vivid imagery is completely non-human. Hartley populates the scene with birdlife, ﬂ owers, 
and scent, yet there is no mention of the Maori inhabitants. The landscape Hartley paints in such garish 
colors is best summed up by the term the British Empire used to describe pre-colonial aboriginal-inhabited 
Australia: Terra nullius, “nobody’ s land.” Like Hartley’ s description, this term is a rhetorical sleight-of-hand: 
it attempts to empty the landscape of indigenous occupants, this rendering the way open for the colonizer to 
assert their dominance.
Historical revisionism
This, then, is one tactic in forging a Pakeha identity: to turn back towards an idealized vision of Britishness 
while simultaneously denigrating the signiﬁ cance of indigenous Maori. Another more recent tactic is to 
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attack Maori’ s very claim to indigeneity. The issue of Maori sovereignty in New Zealand centers, in large 
part, on the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi, a pledge between Maori tribal authorities and the British Government. 
Since the 1970s there has been signiﬁ cant debate as to the meaning and legal ramiﬁ cations of the Treaty, 
with differences between the English and Maori versions of the document resulting in signiﬁ cant ambiguity. 
Since the 1975 Treaty of Waitangi Act, the overall trend in Treaty interpretation has been in favor of Maori 
land-rights and sovereignty (though these interpretations have not always carried across into government 
policy). In 2014, the Waitangi Tribunal (the commission of inquiry that issues recommendations to the 
government on treaty matters) ruled that “the rangatira [Maori authorities] who signed te Tiriti o [the treaty 
of] Waitangi in February 1840 did not cede their sovereignty to Britain” (p. xxii).
　This increased focused on indigenous rights has provoked anxiety amongst some Pakeha and, at the 
extremes of white nationalism, caused a drive towards somewhat fantastical historical revisionism. One of 
the more vocal proponents of such reinterpretations of history is the One New Zealand Foundation. A nation-
alist organization founded as a political party in 1999, the Foundation has, since deregistration in 2006, 
focused on activism and advocacy. The Foundation claims that “the part-Maori population of New Zealand 
now enjoys privileges which by-pass democratic principles of one nation in law and Government” (n.d., para 
3). The Foundation’ s use of the term “part-Maori” here is signiﬁ cant: the implication is that, after over one 
hundred years of intermarriage between Maori and Pakeha, Maori have somehow invalidated their indige-
nous status. Another more ambitious approach the Foundations takes (detailed on the website in an article 
titled “Proof of Pre Maori”) is to claim that Maori have never been truly indigenous: that the generally 
accepted historical account of initial Polynesian migration to these islands is false, and that early European 
voyagers were the true indigenous inhabitants (Ross Baker, 2004).
　As journalist Scott Hamilton has recently pointed out, the ﬁ rst claim of this nature was made by Kerry 
Bolton̶one of the founders of the far-right New Zealand National Socialist Party ̶in his 1987 book Lords of 
the Soil, in which he argued that Europeans had dwelt in New Zealand since “ancient times” (quoted by Mike 
Barrington, 2017, para. 19). Bolton drew upon Maori oral accounts of a since-extinct tribe known as the 
“Ngāti Hotu,” arguing that this group was, in fact, a white-skinned precursor to the Maori that was subse-
quently wiped out by the aggressive Polynesian newcomers (Hamilton, para. 10-11). As Hamilton somewhat 
facetiously puts it, this “fantasy of a white tangata whenua is the work of Europeans marooned a long way 
from Europe.” More substantially, Debbie McCauley has described a broader cultural rise in what she terms 
“Celtic resistance identity” (2011, para. 23). McCauley uses the Spanish sociologist Manuel Castell’ s term 
“resistance identity” to mean a sense of self that emerges as part of “building trenches of resistance and 
survival on the basis on principles different from, or opposed to, those permeating the institutions of society” 
(Castell, 2009, p. 8). According to McCauley, for Bolton and the One New Zealand Foundation this opposi-
tional selfhood rests upon a “pseudo-historical identity” that posits a long sequence of waves of pre-Polyne-
sian arrivals in New Zealand, beginning with the Phoenicians 2666 years ago and including “Mauryans [a 
civilization in India over two thousand years ago], Greeks, Celts, Arabs, Tamils, Portuguese, and Spanish” 
(McCauley, para. 23).
　Such revisionist theories have also been discussed by Ken Ring, an author and astrologer who has 
received some small fame in the New Zealand media for his claims that the cycles of the Moon profoundly 
inﬂ uence both weather patterns and the occurrence of earthquakes. In 2004, Ring published an article on his 
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website that included speculation about the pre-Maori colonization of New Zealand. Ring has since taken the 
article down, however it continues to be quoted on message boards around the internet. In it, Ring ﬁ nds 
evidence for pre-Maori European colonization of New Zealand in archeological sites such as “the large 
ancient stone circle at Mangonui [sic] Bluff near Dargaville which” he claims “displays the same diameter 
dimensions as Stonehenge (288 feet), which some claim could be further proof of the existence of the Indo/
Egypto/European culture in NZ many thousands of years ago” (2004, para. 11). Ring also reinterprets Maori 
legends of the patupaiarehe, a race of spiritual beings analogous to the elves and fairies of European folklore. 
According to oral tradition the patupaiarehe, lacking the divine powers of gods or demi-gods, lived in their 
own communities separate from areas frequented by humans. The stories describe them as pale skinned 
with blond or reddish hair, some with pale blue eyes. Unlike the Maori, they did not tattoo themselves 
(Martin Wikaira, 2007, para. 1-4). Ring suggests that these legends may be grounded in historical fact, the 
patupaiarehe being an actual human tribe with links to a pre-Maori culture (para. 11). Pointing out that the 
patupaiarehe “are mentioned from the north of NZ to the Ureweras [a mountain range in the east-central 
North Island] in Maori oral tradition,” he goes on to claim that “it seems along with other now-vanquished 
tribes they were hunted to extinction” (para. 12).
　Ring cites American historian Charles Hapgood’ s 1966 book Maps of the Ancient Sea Kings that “there 
were maps of the southern ocean in existence 20,000 years ago. . . . stored in the libraries of Alexandria” 
(para. 15). Hapgood’ s theories are given little credit by most contemporary authorities. They were, however, 
used by Erich von Däniken to back up his claims of extraterrestrial intervention in world history (1973, p. 
15). There is also a suggestion of cultural superiority here: by suggesting that Maori came to the islands of 
the Paciﬁ c as the “work gangs” of “Euro/Indy traders,” Ring shifts their historical identity from an explor-
ative seafaring people to that, as he puts it, “slaves.” He does claim, however, that he does this “not to deni-
grate present-day Maori status, but simply to accord Maori a rightful place in the nation’ s history” (para. 15).
　Irrespective of Ring’ s own views on Maori, this kind of revisionist approach to history does fuel attempts to 
delegitimize the cause of Maori sovereignty. If Pakeha settlement predates Maori in New Zealand then, in a 
sense, European colonization of these islands was actually re-colonization, a return to a place already made 
home. Furthermore, the idea that the patupaiarehe or Ngāti Hotu were the victims of Maori genocide can be 
made to alleviate Pakeha guilt over the violence inherent in British colonization. Thus, whereas the imposi-
tion of terra nullius attempts to remove indigenous claims simply by ignoring them, the revisionist attempts, 
through the reinterpretation of history, to appropriate the term indigenous for their own use.
Progressive Pakeha identity
If we examine the issue of Pakeha identity as conceptualized by more progressive, less nationalistic Pakeha 
thinkers, we ﬁ nd a similar ﬁ xation on the meaning of indigenous. There is, of course, an alternative to ﬁ xing 
one’ s sense of cultural identity to a historical model: that is to focus not on the past but on the present. The 
progressive approach considers Pakeha identity as something multiplex and evolving, a product of the past 
but not determined by or beholden to it. Such an approach moves away, by necessity, from the monocultural 
frameworks of both colonialism and Celtic-prehistory. Instead, it views contemporary culture as something 
formed from a multiplicity of cultural strands: something new born from combinations of the old.
　This approach can be found in the work of the late New Zealand historian Michael King, who claimed that 
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he identiﬁ ed, as a Pakeha, “as one who has always taken it for granted that I belonged in this land.” He goes 
on to claim that his “people, predominantly remnants of the Irish diaspora, came here to a country where the 
ﬁ rst indigenous people had made a treaty with the Crown that permitted colonisation and gave us those two 
streams of people with rights to be here, tangata whenua [people of the land] and tangata tiriti [people of the 
treaty]” (n.d., para. 15). Elsewhere, he argues that the racial and cultural identity of Pakeha “could only 
accrete in New Zealand from the Maori, European and wider human ingredients that History has cast up on 
these shores . . . what we are acknowledging here is not something foreign: it is a second indigenous New 
Zealand culture” (2011, p. 40).
　Others, however, have rejected such claims for an indigenous Pakeha culture by questioning whether 
Pakeha are truly committed to such a new identity. Donna Awatere Huata does this, in her seminal 1984 book 
Maori Sovereignty, by denying that Pakeha have made New Zealand their cultural home. In her book, she 
sets out “to show the lie of multiculturalism by pointing out how the Pakeha does not culturally co-exist with 
the tangata whenua” (p. 8). The argument here is that Pakeha culture is too anchored in European identity to 
truly constitute a new indigeneity. As Bruce Jesson put it in 1982, “Pakeha New Zealanders, even radical 
Pakeha New Zealanders, seem reluctant to renounce their British heritage in favor of an unambiguously New 
Zealand identity” (quoted in Laura Kamau, 2010, p. 26). Sociologist Avril Bell has made a similar argument, 
stating that “if Pakeha are to be indigenous [then] they are cut off from their history as the descendants and 
inheritors of the privileges of the colonisers of Aotearoa.” They must, she goes on, abandon that history “as 
Pakeha are ‘born’ post colonization” (1996, p. 156). For these thinkers, indigeneity cannot be grounded in a 
prior identity: there can be no origin elsewhere that predates the indigenous identity. King’ s vision of Pakeha 
indigeneity, therefore, is invalid in that it attempts to incorporate into itself a distinct European thread.
　Sheilagh Walker furthers this vein of argument. Like Bell, Walker attacks the assumption, implicit in King, 
that Pakeha “have been removed from their historical, cultural, and colonial roots.” Walker goes on, however, 
to analyze the structures of power implicit in such debates over cultural and national identity. Whereas King’ s 
claim is essentially an attempt at legitimizing the psychological attachment̶the feeling of belonging̶of 
Pakeha New Zealanders to their nation of birth, Walker adds to this a Foucauldian analysis of how such ques-
tions of identity are part of the power dynamics of New Zealand society. Arguing that “many Pakeha . . . deny 
their dependence on Maori identity as a referent for their own identity,” she goes on to claim that “King’ s 
claim that Pakeha culture is a ‘second indigenous culture’ ” is problematic because it “takes the potential 
power of Maori critique out of Maori hands,” the status of Maori as tangata whenua (people of the land) 
“belittled by his co-opting of the term” indigenous (1996, p. 18). The implication here is that the very term 
indigenous is itself a manifestation of resistance identity and that as such its meaning must be tightly 
controlled so as to prevent the power of that resistance from being weakened.
　For Ani Mikaere, an academic specializing in Maori law and philosophy, the dynamics of this Foucauldian 
power-struggle is central to the issue of Pakeha identity. She views the Pakeha desire for self-determination 
as unjust in that “it is the wronged party [Maori] who is being expected to submit to terms imposed by the 
wrong-doer [Pakeha]” (2004, p. 18). She goes on to argue that “for Pakeha to gain legitimacy here, it is they 
who must place their trust in Mäori, not the other way around.” Like Walker, Mikaere views indigeneity as a 
legitimization of power, claiming that “it is for the tangata whenua to determine Pakeha status in this land” 
through “a process of negotiation” done on Maori terms. “Nothing less will sufﬁ ce,” she concludes, if Pakeha 
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“truly want to gain the sense of belonging they so crave, the sense of identity that until now has proven so 
elusive” (p. 19).
　Mikaere points out that many Pakeha will resist surrendering even a part of their right to self-determina-
tion to Maori. Indeed, recent writing from a diversity of Pakeha has expressed a desire to integrate respect-
fully with Maori culture while at the same time resisting any externally-imposed identity. Airini Beautrais, 
who won the prestigious 2016 Landfall essay competition with her piece “Umlaut,” an examination of the 
author’ s own sense of European Pakeha identity, concludes the essay with a litany of self-deﬁ nition: “I was 
born here, and I have come here from somewhere else. I have brought a few treasures with me.” Beautrais’ s 
European heritage is represented here not as something that determines her identity but rather as a “trea-
sure,” something that enriches her present self rather than molds it into a speciﬁ c shape. She goes on: “Some 
of my waka were sailing ships. . . . Some of my waka were steamships.” Beautrais’ s use of the Maori term 
“waka” is part of her broader attempt at engaging in the kind of negotiation with Maori culture that Mikaere 
advocates. There is deference to indigenous authority when she writes: “I know where I am from. I know 
whose land I live on . . . I will say bird names, tree names, place names as the ﬁ rst people gave them” (para. 
30). Yet at the same time, Beautrais attempts to hold elements of her identity back from anything that might 
be imposed upon her by others. In the ﬁ nal sentence of the essay, Beautrais articulates a more ambiguous 
sense of belonging, writing that “I carry all this with me at home, and at my other homes, and when I pass 
ports” (para. 30). This rendering of “homes” as plural leads into another approach to Pakeha identity: one 
that neither seeks to return to a European foundation nor attempts to construct a new indigeneity. Instead, 
we can see here a sense of the self as ﬂ uid and resistant to categorization. In this approach, self-identity 
becomes delocalized, dispersed across a multiplicity of cultures and histories. Jahan Ramazani, writing in a 
non-New Zealand context, has described such an identity as “ﬂ oating free in an ambient universe of denation-
alized, deracialized form and discourses” (p. 350). Salman Rushdie, also writing in a more global context, has 
also described such a state. In his 1999 novel The Ground Beneath Her Feet Rushdie̶a Indian-born, British-
educated writer who famously broke with his Muslim heritage early in life̶describes the experience of the 
denationalized individual, which is “to go through the feeling of being lost, into the chaos . . . to accept the 
loneliness, the wild panic of losing your moorings, the vertiginous terror of the horizon spinning round and 
round like the edge of a coin tossed in the air” (p. 177). Despite the “vertiginous terror” of this experience, 
there is a strong sense here that the ﬂ uidness of such a state is liberating and ultimately positive.
　The desire for such a ﬂ uid form of self-identity is a persuasive one. It is articulated especially vividly 
throughout Andy Xie’ s recent essay “ The Great New Zealand Myth,” which won the 2017 Landfall Charles 
Brasch Young Writers’ Essay Competition. In the essay, Xie, who came to New Zealand as a small child, 
describes how “growing up in a new country . . . immigrant children have no consistent model of identity to 
follow.” However, he goes on, they “are all free to create and to become ourselves” (para. 12). For Xie, this act 
of self-creation is fueled by literature, which offers a utopian model of cultural and racial transcendence: as 
he puts it, in books he encountered “an inﬁ nite number of human voices calling to me, inviting me to enter 
into their worlds” (para. 8). Through the process of engagement with these voices, he goes on, immigrants 
“make New Zealand̶which we ﬁ rst encounter as a formless land, obscured by a long white cloud of uncer-
tain possibility̶our home, which can become anything and everything that we want it to be” (para. 12). This 
world of unfettered potential sits as uneasily with the sovereignty concerns of indigenous activists as it does 
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with this reactionary revisionism of white nationalist Pakeha. There is an additional problem with such ideas 
in that they tend to appeal most to the intellectual and the literary-minded. The majority of New Zealanders̶
like the majority of people in most nations̶do not live in the imaginary homelands of literature. To them, 
identity is something less abstract and more localized. For those whose sense of identity is grounded in the 
more concrete bedrock of family, community, and shared historical narrative, there seems little consolation 
in the more cerebral sense of identity evoked by writers such as Rushdie and Xie.
　A Pakeha writer of Chinese heritage, Tze Ming Mok, has penned a description of the experience of 
minority immigrants that, at ﬁ rst glance, resonates with the vertiginous energies of ﬂ uid identity. As she puts 
it, immigrants “are magical people . . . [with] the power of ﬂ ight, the power of shrinking, and of invisibility.” In 
Mok’ s description, however, there are multiple levels of irony. By “invisibility” she is referring speciﬁ cally to 
the way Chi Phung, a Vietnamese-born immigrant, lay injured and ignored on a Christchurch street after 
being assaulted by white supremacist skinheads. On a broader level, she is referring to the pressure immi-
grant minorities feel to assimilate into̶or at least avoid challenging̶the dominant culture. As she puts it, 
immigrant survival in “New Zealand has historically been a matter of assimilating into a culture that is 
unquestionably white.” The magical powers she poetically assigns to immigrants, then, are not liberating 
powers of self-transformation; they are, rather, a drive towards self-denial and cultural surrender. Removal of 
one’ s cultural inheritance is seen not as a positive shift into “some impossible idea of a ‘colour-blind’ nation 
free of ethnicity,” but rather as a surrender to another, more powerful culture (2004, p. 22). Thus, for Mok, 
the ﬂ uidity of the immigrant experience is dangerous; in that state, the potential for self-realization is 
matched, if not overwhelmed, by the potential for dissolution. Ultimately, it may be this sense of danger that 
drives both non-European and European Pakeha to search for new forms of self-determination, attempting to 
solidity their identities̶at least to some degree̶before they are swept away in the ﬂ ux of broader cultural 
forces.
Conclusion
Such are the energies that have fueled, and that continue to fuel, attempts to deﬁ ne Pakeha identity in New 
Zealand. As we have seen, there are many polarizing ways to make this deﬁ nition, some of which turn back-
ward into the past, others that seek to form new concepts of identity itself. There is, however, no easy resolu-
tion to the question of just what it means to be Pakeha. On the contrary, increased immigration seems sure 
to complicate the issue, with more and more New Zealanders bringing with them identities linked to regions 
far removed from both Polynesia and Europe. When Abel Tasman coined the name New Zealand in 1642, he 
drew that name from a small region in Holland: Zeeland, literally “sea land,” a term refering to an area of land 
surrounded on several sides by sea. In the 21st century, New Zealand is a different, metaphorical kind of sea-
land: it is a nation in ﬂ ux, an oceanic zone traversed by varied and frequently conﬂ icting currents. In the 
future, it may orient itself towards older models of European or Maori hegemony, or it may arrange itself into 
more multiplex transnational modes of being. For the moment, though, Pakeha continue to remain poised (to 
appropriate Curnow’ s phrase) before those “unknown / But not improbable provinces” of postcolonial iden-
tity.
　Since the writing of this article, the One New Zealand Foundation website has gone ofﬂ ine. The reference list refers to 
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archived copies of the website.
Notes
1)　Pakeha is a Maori word referring to New Zealanders of European descent: more recently, it has been used to mean 
any non-Maori New Zealanders. In this article, I use the term in the second, broader sense.
2)　in a 2016 interview with Duncan Campbell the speech-writer, Christopher Elder, would claim that Bolger simply 
referred to New Zealand as “part of the Asia-Paciﬁ c” (2016, para. 23)
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